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The market value of U.S. corporations was nearly halved following
the Oil Crisis of October 1973. Real energy prices more than doubled
by the end of the decade, increasing energy costs and spurring inno-
vation in energy-saving technologies by corporations. This paper uses
a neo-classical growth model to quantify the impact of the increase in
energy prices on the market value of U.S. corporations. In the model,
corporations adopt energy-saving technologies as a response to the en-
ergy price shock and the price of installed capital falls due to investment
irreversibility. The model calibrated to match the subsequent decline
in energy consumption in the U.S. generates a 25% decline in market
valuation; accounting for more than half of what is observed in the
data.
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11 Introduction
The market value of U.S. corporations, relative to the replacement cost of
their tangible assets, was nearly halved during 1973-74 (See Figure 1). This
ratio, also known as the Tobin￿ s (average) q, averaged 1.06 over the 1962-72
period, fell sharply during 1973-74, and stagnated for the following decade.
Over 1974-1984, Tobin￿ s q for U.S. corporations averaged only 0.56, 49%
less relative to the decade prior to 1973. This decline in market valuations
was highly persistent as they recovered to their pre-1973 levels only by the
late 90￿ s.
Figure 1: Tobin￿ s average q: Market value relative to replacement value of
tangible assets of U.S. corporations
This abrupt decline in corporate market valuations coincides exactly with
the oil crisis initiated by the OPEC embargo announced in early October of
1973. The largest drop in market values occurred in the 4th quarter of 1973
and throughout 1974 (See Figure 2).
2Figure 2: Market Value of U.S. corporations relative to GDP
The oil crisis translated into a 38% percent increase in real energy prices
over 1973-74. Energy prices continued to rise for the rest of the decade,
especially during 1979-80 due to the events in Iran (See Figure 3). By 1981,
real energy prices were 2.2 times higher than what they were in 1972. Since
1982, energy prices have been declining. However they have yet to come
back to their pre-1973 levels after 30 years.
Figure 3: Energy prices relative to GDP de￿ ator (1972 = 1)
The links between the increase in energy prices and the fall in market
valuations seem intuitive and straightforward: First, the sharp and persis-
tent increase in energy costs must have squeezed both current and expected
3future dividends causing the market value of us corporations to go down.
Second, as the increase in energy costs was highly persistent, corporations
started adopting and investing in new technologies that were more energy-
e¢ cient. This spur in energy-saving technologies resulted in capital obso-
lescence for the old energy-ine¢ cient technologies driving their value down
(cf. Baily [3]). Although these links are intuitive and the timing of the
two events is suggestive, the energy explanation has had di¢ culties both
empirically and theoretically and has led many authors to entertain other
explanations for the stock market crash of 1973-74.
The main empirical criticism regarding the energy explanation is that
there is not a high enough correlation between the drop in market values
and the pre-1973 cost share of energy for corporations (cf. Wei [45] and
Greenwood & Jovanovic [14]). For the manufacturing sectors at the level of
2-digit SIC code, the correlation is only 0.09. On the theoretical side it has
been di¢ cult to construct models where energy prices have a quantitatively
signi￿cant impact on corporate market values primarily because the share
of energy in total costs of businesses is small. In particular, Wei [45] uses a
putty-clay model to ￿nd that energy increases can account for only 2% of
the decline in market valuation.
The ￿rst criticism would be especially strong if rising energy costs were
the main channel through which energy a⁄ected market values and Tobin￿ s
q. However, this cannot be the case. In fact there is no reason to expect a
drop in Tobin￿ s q due to an increase in energy prices as long as the price of
installed capital does not deviate from potential replacements. If capital is
homogeneous (i.e. the replacement capital is exactly the same as installed
capital in terms of energy e¢ ciency and other respects), then Tobin￿ s q which
measures market value (or value of installed capital) relative to replacement
value will not be altered regardless of the cost share of energy. In this respect,
the introduction of new energy-e¢ cient technologies and the obsolescence of
old technologies appears to be a better explanation for the drop in Tobin￿ s
q. We would expect to see a higher drop in Tobin￿ s q in an industry that can
reduce energy costs through the adoption of new technologies even when its
initial cost share of energy is smaller than another industry which cannot
4adopt new technologies. For manufacturing industries at the 2-digit SIC
code level, the correlation between the drop in market value and the drop
in energy costs following the energy crisis is 0.41. The latter ￿gure is much
higher than the correlation of the drop in market value with the initial cost
share of energy.
On regards to the second criticism, we should ￿rst note that the energy
costs in the business sector is not that small, it amounted to almost 7.5-8%
of the value of output produced by the business sector prior to the 73 crisis
instead of the 4% cited by Wei [45]. The relevant price index to look at is the
energy consumption and not production prices as businesses are consumers
of energy. Second, even though the putty-clay model is intended to capture
price induced savings in energy by allowing substitution in new vintages
of capital, it counterfactually predicts that real energy-output ratio starts
going up as energy prices start to decline in the 80￿ s and 90￿ s. As shown in
Figure 4, real energy use (as a share of output) declined monotonically after
1973-74 even when energy prices were going down in the 80￿ s. This fact
is consistent with a technology that is characterized by increasingly lower
energy requirements per unit of production (i.e. energy-saving technological
change) and not consistent with a putty-clay model.
Figure 4: Energy expenditure (nominal) and energy use (real) of the
business sector as a share of business GDP
5In this paper we use neo-classical growth theory to address whether
and if so how much of the decline in corporate market valuations can be
accounted for by the observed changes in energy prices. The model is a
dynamic general equilibrium model with technology-speci￿c capital and in-
vestment irreversibility. These assumptions are standard in the literature
(cf. Sargent [39], Dixit and Pyndick [9]), and allow for Tobin￿ s q to fall
below 1, as in the data. In the model economy, ￿rms adopt energy-saving
technologies as a response to the energy price shock and the price of in-
stalled capital falls due to investment irreversibility. Firms do not adopt
these energy-saving technologies prior to the energy shock since there is a
minimum investment requirement similar to Boldrin & Levine [4] before the
￿rms can operate these new technologies. With low energy prices, ￿rms
forego this cost. However, with sharp increases in energy prices it pays for
them to do so. We calibrate the parameters of the model to match certain
features of the U.S. economy, in particular we set the energy-e¢ ciency of the
new technologies to match the decline in real energy output ratios. Given
this feature, our model suggests energy prices can account for at least half
of the drop in Tobin￿ s q, and partially for its stagnation throughout the 70￿ s
and 80￿ s.
Other explanations put forward for the stock market crash of 1973-74
are the IT revolution (cf. Greenwood & Jovanovic [14])and investment sub-
sidies provided by the government to businesses (cf. McGrattan & Prescott
[29]). The IT explanation is similar to our explanation in spirit, whereby
the innovation of information technologies drive down the price of installed
capital. Peralta-Alva [33] uses a neoclassical growth model with capital ac-
cumulation to test this idea and ￿nds that the quality of new technologies
that will generate the observed drop in Tobin￿ s q would also generate a two-
fold increase in investment, sharply in contrast with the data. McGrattan
& Prescott [29] argue that the investment subsidies drive a wedge between
the price of installed capital and replacement capital and can account for
one third of the decline in market valuations observed in the 70￿ s. Our
model is not inconsistent with this explanation, since part of the reason for
investment subsidies was to encourage ￿rms to adopt new energy-e¢ cient
6technologies. We nevertheless abstract from subsidies in our model, and
concentrate on the e⁄ects of the oil crisis and energy-saving technological
change in isolation from the government response.
Section 2 o⁄ers evidence on innovation of energy-saving technologies by
￿rms after the oil crisis. Section 3 lays out the model. Section 4 discusses
calibration, computation and ￿ndings. Section 5 concludes.
2 Innovation in Energy-Saving Technologies after
1974
The fundamental assumption in our analysis is that capital embodies a par-
ticular technology. Such an assumption is familiar from Robert M. Solow
(1960) and ￿ts particularly well with inventions that transform the whole
economy. In our model, the introduction of a new type of capital gives birth
to a new aggregate production function characterized by its energy-saving
properties. In what follows, we provide empirical support for this hypothesis.
As is well-known in the environmental economics literature, energy-saving
technologies transformed U.S. production methods. In particular, the U.S.
energy intensity - the ratio of BTUS of energy use to output - halved over the
1974-2000 period. First, we give some examples of the energy-saving tech-
nologies behind the decline in the U.S. energy intensity. Then, we provide
additional evidence that suggests energy-saving methods were developed and
adopted as a result of the energy crisis of 1973-74.
One of the most important changes in the manufacturing sector dur-
ing the 1975-1995 period was the increased use of Advanced Manufacturing
Technologies. Examples of this include computer aided design and manufac-
turing, numerically-controlled machines, and information networks. These
improvements constitute a form of embodied technological change. It is
new capital, including both hardware and software, that incorporates the
advancements in technology. Doms and Dunne [11] use establishment-level
data to determine changes in energy and electricity intensity arising from dif-
ferences in plant characterisitics and energy prices. Their two main ￿ndings
7are ￿rst, plants that utilize higher numbers of advanced technologies are less
energy intensive and rely more on electricity as fuel source. In particular,
plants based on advanced manufacturing technologies consume less energy
per unit of output, but consume a higher proportion of electricity. Sec-
ond, plants constructed during the period of high energy prices, 1973-1983,
are generally more energy e¢ cient than plants built during other periods.
Hence, the adoption of advanced manufacturing technologies is key to un-
derstanding both; the steady decline in energy intensity and the increase in
electricity￿ s share of total energy consumption that started around 1974.
Schiper [40] documents that most of the decline in energy intensity of the
us economy can be attributed to improved energy e¢ cency and not to the
level and structure of sectoral activity1. As we discussed before, one impor-
tant reason why the manufacturing sector improved its energy e¢ cency was
the introduction of advanced manufacturing technologies. Another develop-
ment that lowered the energy intensity of all sectors was the introduction
of energy-e¢ cient buildings. U.S. residential and commercial buildings con-
sume 40% of all U.S. energy and are therefore key to understand the trends
in energy intensity. Rosenfeld (1990) ￿nds that most of the e¢ ciency gains
in the heating and cooling of buildings took place during the period of high
energy prices, 1973-1983. During those years, technological improvements
in the heating, lighting and cooling systems2 allowed for a decrease of 1.2
million barrels of oil per day (an amount equal to two-thirds of the daily
output of the Alaskan pipeline) despite the fact that 20 million new homes
were built, and commercial ￿ oor space increased by 40 percent. A sector that
also experienced dramatic energy-saving changes after 1974 was the plastics
industry. This industry is interesting because its major technological leap in
energy-saving, and in overall productivity, involved major restructuring of
the plants producing plastics. Joyce [23] documents that the Union Carbide
1One important example of changes in the structure of sectoral activity is the decline
of manufacturing - an energy intensive sector - and the rise of the service sector - a less
energy intensive one - measured as a share of GDP.
2Mainly, the adoption of central heating and air-conditioning systems, the development
of compact ￿ uorescent lamps, and the adoption of urban shade-trees and light-colored
surfaces.
8Unipol Process, introduced in the mid 1970s, required a plant much smaller,
produced twice as much product, and lowered the energy e¢ cency of poly-
ethylene production from 8400 BTUS per pound to 1500 BTUS per pound3.
Based on the above discussion we conclude that the assumption of energy
saving technological change being endogenous is a reasonable one and, more
importantly, that the development of the technologies behind the observed
decline in energy intensity coincides with the energy crisis of 1973-1974.
Other authors have suggested a causal link between the energy crisis
and the introduction of energy saving technologies. For example, Schurr
[41] ￿nds that the energy intensity of the U.S. economy started its long-run
decline by the end of World War I and stabilized (actually had a small pos-
itive growth rate) during 1950-1973. He ￿nds that energy intensity declined
at a faster speed between 1973-1983 than any other period in the 20th cen-
tury. He concludes that the introduction of energy-saving technologies re-
sulting from the oil crisis is the main culprit for this faster decline. Popp
(2002) uses patent data to analyze the impact of energy prices on energy-
saving innovation. He ￿nds that the number of successful patent applica-
tions of energy-saving technologies jumped up during the mid 1970￿ s. The
main conclusion of the author, based on econometric analyses, is that en-
ergy prices have a strong, positive impact on the number of energy-saving
technologies.
The sections that follow present a theoretical model with an explicit
causal link between energy prices and the introduction of energy-saving tech-
nologies. We calibrate the model so that it matches the main features of
energy consumption of the U.S. economy. We then test for the asset pric-
ing implications of the energy crisis and the energy-saving innovation that
followed.
3The list of energy saving technologies is long. The interested reader can ￿nd many
more examples in Tester, Wood and Ferrari (1990).
93 The Model Economy
In this section we present a general equilibrium asset pricing model with
capital accumulation. Production is undertaken by corporations which are
in turn owned by in￿nitely-lived households. Energy, an input in production,
is imported from abroad and there is trade balance each period. There
are two types of capital-embodying technologies which di⁄er only in energy
intensities. As such, capital is technology speci￿c and investment decisions
are irreversible.
Prior to 1974, agents assume that energy prices are going to stay at the
pre-crisis level forever. The energy crisis takes place in the beginning of
1974 and takes the agents in the model by surprise. After 1974, the model
is deterministic and the agents have perfect foresight on energy prices.
The Stand-in household
The population in period t is denoted by Nt and ￿ is the constant growth
factor of population, so Nt+1 = ￿Nt: The stand-in household￿ s preferences








1￿￿ for ￿ 6= 1
log(c) for ￿ = 1
where 1=￿ is the constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Each
member of the household is endowed with a unit of time each period which
it supplies inelastically to the labor market. The household participates in a
market for shares of the corporations. Owning a fraction st of the perfectly
divisible share entitles the shareholder to the same fraction of the dividends




pt [Ntct + Vt (st+1 ￿ st)] =
1 X
t=0
pt [wtNt + dtst]
where V is the price and d is the dividends per share of the ￿rm.
The household￿ s problem is to choose sequences of consumption fctg and
asset holdings fstg that maximize utility subject to the period zero budget
constraint.
Corporations
There is a unit measure of identical corporate ￿rms, which operate two
constant returns to scale technologies indexed by 1 and 2. Both these tech-
nologies use capital k, labor n and energy e as inputs to produce an identical
output good y = y1 + y2 where
y1 = [minfk1t;￿e1tg]
￿ (Atn1t)
1￿￿ and y2 = [minfk2t;￿te2tg]
￿ (Btn2t)
1￿￿
￿ and f￿tg are parameters governing the energy-e¢ ciency of each of the
available technologies.4 There is a minimum level of capital ki requirement
for each technology before that technology is operational and can be used
to produce output [c.f. [4]]:
yit = 0 if kit < ki for i = 1;2
At and Bt are the levels of labor-augmenting productivity at period t for type
1 and type 2 technologies correspondingly. Before each type of technology
is adopted (i.e. when ki < ki for i = 1;2), there￿ s uncertainty regarding the
initial level of productivity which prevails once the technology is operational.
Let ￿i be the ￿rst period with ki > ki. Then A￿i can take two values; A
g
0 with
probability ￿ and Ab
0 with probability (1 ￿ ￿). Similarly B￿i can take two
values; B
g
0 with probability ￿ and Bb
0 with probability (1 ￿ ￿) There is no
further uncertainty; once a technology is adopted, it grows at an exogeneous
4Note that the energy-e¢ ciency of the second technology is time-dependent and will
increase over time. We need this feature to match the observed decline in energy-output
ratios.
11factor ￿ (i.e. At+1 = ￿At and Bt+1 = ￿Bt).
The law of motion for capital accumulation for each type of capital is
given by
kit+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)kit + xit for i = 1;2 (1)
where xi is investment in capital type i and ￿ is the depreciation rate. Note
that capital is technology speci￿c, and investment decisions are irreversible
in the sense that once investment is decided on a certain type of capital,
that capital cannot be transformed into the other type of capital.
The corporations hire labor services and import energy from abroad,
but they own their capital and in turn pay dividends d to their shareholders.
Shareholders are the residual claimants on the income of corporations, hence
dividends are equal to ￿rm income less payments for wages, energy and new
investments:
dt = yt ￿ wt (n1t + n2t) ￿ pe
t (e1t + e2t) ￿ x1t ￿ x2t
where pe is the relative price of energy. The objective of the corporations
is to choose sequences of investment fxitg, labor fnitgand energy feitg for





The economy￿ s resource constraint is now given by
Ntct + x1t + x2t + pe
t (e1t + e2t) = yt; for all t: (2)
Note that the above speci￿cation dictates a trade balance each period, where
energy imports from abroad are paid o⁄ fully, and there is no foreign bor-
rowing or lending. The market clearing in the labor market is given by
Nt = n1t + n2t
12Finally, there is a market clearing condition for market for shares, which
requires st = 1 for all t:
3.1 Tobin￿ s (average) q
Tobin￿ s average q is de￿ned as the ratio of market value to the replacement
cost of capital. In the model described above, market value corresponds
to Vt. Furthermore, constraints (1) and (2) force the relative price of new
capital to equal one, and thus the replacement cost of capital (at the end of





As is well known, a necessary condition for q to fall below one is that at
least one of the irreversibility constraints binds. Intuitively, the amount
of energy-ine¢ cient capital (type 1) becomes "too big" with the increase
in energy prices. In a world where investment decisions are reversible or
capital is not technology speci￿c, agents would transform this extra capital
into consumption or would utilize it in the energy-e¢ cient technology. Since
they are not allowed to do either, the price of installed capital of type 1 falls.
The magnitude of the fall is dependent on how much these constraints bind.
4 Calibration and Results
In this section we discuss how the model was calibrated and computed. Also
we lay out the ￿ndings from the model and compare them with the data.
4.1 Calibration
To calibrate the parameters of the model, we follow Cooley & Prescott [8]
and match certain features of the us economy in the pre-crisis period of
1962-1972 to the balanced growth path of the model. We set ￿ equal to 1:01
to match the 1% average growth rate of population, and ￿ equal to 1.02 to
match the average per capita growth rate of U.S. corporate output which
13is 2%. ￿ is calibrated to match one minus the labor share of income in the
corporate sector, obtaining a value for ￿ of 0.33. ￿ governs the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution and we take this number from Prescott [35], and
let ￿ = 2. We set ￿ equal to 0:998 to match a steady state real interest
rate of 5% and ￿ equal to 0:06 to match an investment-output ratio of 20%
and capital-output ratio of 1.5.
We have assumed that the oil crisis was completely unexpected and
prior to the crisis, agents expected energy prices to remain constant in theri
1972 levels. Prior to the crisis, corporations were endowed with only type
one capital, and they had not made any investment in type two capital.
We choose the minimum investment requirements and also the initial pro-
ductivity parameters and probabilities such that given the expectations on
energy prices5, agents would choose not to adopt the second technology and
only operate the ￿rst technology prior to the crisis, but they adopt the sec-
ond, more energy-e¢ cient technology once the oil shock occurs. With these
considerations, we set k1 equal to zero, and k2 to 0:20 which is 10% of the
total capital stock. Since the ￿rst technology has already been adopted, the
initial level of productivity for technology 1 is irrelevant. We set the initial
level of productivity of technology 2 in the good state equal to technology
1￿ s level of productivity (i.e. B
g
￿2 = A￿2) and in the bad state 10% lower. ￿
is set equal to 0:45.
Finally, we set ￿ so that the model￿ s energy use to output ratio matches
the 1962-72 U.S. average, and compute the sequence f￿tg
2001
t=1973 that min-
imizes the distance between the equilibrium energy output ratio from the
model, and the associated data series. The resulting sequence is plotted in
Figure 5:
5Note again that prior to 1974, agents believe the energy prices are going to stay at
their pre-crises level forever. Once the energy crises occurs, they have perfect foresight on
energy prices.
14Figure 5: The parameters regulating energy-intensity of the two
technologies
4.2 Findings
As previously described, the energy-saving properties of the new technol-
ogy are such that the model matches the observed energy output ratio: in
spite of the sharp decrease in energy prices in the 80￿ s, energy use declines
monotonically, as in the data. The energy output ratio from the model and
of the U.S. corporate sector are shown in Figure 6 below:
Figure 6: Energy-output ratio: model vs. data
The observed changes in energy prices, coupled with the availability of a
new technology with energy saving factor f￿g, translate into a 25% drop in
15market valuations, about 1/2 of what is observed in the data. The model￿ s
predictions for q, and its U.S. data counter part are plotted in Figure 7
below:
Figure 7: Tobin￿ s q: model vs. data
The increase in energy prices generates a modest slowdown in output as
shown in the following graph:
Figure 8: Output: model vs. data
It also generates a strong contraction in investment. We believe the latter
is due to the simplicity of our model. We have abstracted from changes in
16investment tax credits, from the impact of the productivity slowdown, and
from the increasing importance of information technologies. All of those
changes are known to make investment increase and, more importantly, to
generate sudden drops in market valuations (cf. McGrattan and Prescott
[29], Boldrin and Peralta-Alva [5], and Peralta-Alva [33]).
Figure 9: Investment-output ratio: model vs. data
5 Conclusion
This paper employs a calibrated dynamic general equilibrium model to eval-
uate how much of the stock market crash of 1973-74 can be accounted for
by changes in energy prices. In a world where capital is technology speci￿c,
and investment decisions irreversible, we ￿nd that the observed changes in
energy prices, together with the energy-saving technologies derived from the
energy use series data, translate into a 25% drop in Tobin￿ s average q. This
corresponds almost half of the observed drop in q of the mid-70￿ s . Our
model is qualitatively consistent not only with the data patterns in equity
prices, but also with the economic slowdown of the mid-70￿ s.
The basic economic mechanism we considered is the following: A sudden
increase in energy prices renders old capital obsolete, and causes its mar-
ket valuation to collapse. Old technologies are abandoned and gradually
replaced by energy saving ones, better suited for the new economic condi-
tions. Old capital is left to depreciate, and labor ￿ ows from the old to the
17new type of technology. The replacement process is gradual, and market
values recover in a smooth fashion.
In our model, the possibility of adoption of a new energy-saving technol-
ogy is always available, but costly, hence agents do not introduce it unless the
economic conditions demand it. We believe that the energy price increase
of 1973-74 gave agents enough incentives to pay the cost, and to innovate in
such energy saving technologies.
Our analysis indicates that changes in energy prices should be part of
any theory of the stock market collapse of 1973-74.
6 Data Appendix
Here we outline how the major series used in the ￿gures were constructed.
Figure 1. Ratio of Market Value to Replacement Cost of Tangible Assets
for Corporations
Market value of corporations was constructed using data from the Flow of
Funds Accounts of the United States (FOF) issued by the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System (FRB).6 In the FOF, domestic corporations
are divided into non￿nancial and ￿nancial corporate business. Financial
corporations are further divided to the following categories as listed in Ta-
ble F.213: Commercial banking, life insurance companies, other insurance
companies, closed-end funds, exchange-traded funds, real estate investment
trusts (REITs) and brokers and dealers.
Our measure of market value re￿ ects both equity value and debt of all
domestic corporations, and all direct or indirect (through mutual funds)
intercorporate holdings of corporate equity and debt has been netted out. To
that e⁄ect market value of domestic corporations (MV) has been constructed
as follows:
MV = Corporate equity issued by non￿nancial and ￿nancial corporate
businesses + Net ￿nancial liabilities (i.e. Total liabilities - total ￿nancial as-
sets) of nonfarm non￿nancial corporate businesses,commercial banks, life in-
6This data can be downloaded from the FRB website at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/data.htm.
18surance companies, other insurance companies, closed-end funds, exchange-
traded funds, REITs, and security brokers and dealers.
Replacement cost of tangible assets of corporations was constructed us-
ing data from the Fixed Assets Tables (FA) reported by the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis (BEA)7 and also from the FOF. Our measure of tangible
assets include all nonresidential and residential ￿xed assets, plus invento-
ries. Corporate ￿xed assets are the sum of corporate nonresidential ￿xed
assets and corporate residential ￿xed assets. Stock of inventories held by
nonfarm non￿nancial corporations is from the FOF. We assume ￿nancial
corporations hold no inventories as their inventory investment is zero in the
product account, and we neglect inventories hold by farm corporations since
they are negligibly small.
Figure 2. Energy Prices relative to the GDP De￿ ator
We follow the methodology outlined in Atkeson & Kehoe [2] and con-
struct an energy price de￿ ator from a weighted average of coal, natural gas,
petroleum and electricity consumed in the commercial, industrial and the
transportations sectors. This excludes residential consumption as we focus
only on the business sector and also energy consumed by the electric power
sector as in our model all energy is imported. We use quantity and price
data reported in the Annual Energy Review (AER) 2001.8 The quantity of
each type of energy (measured in units of Btu) consumed in the commer-
cial, industrial and the transportation sectors are from Tables 2.1c, 2.1d,
2.1e respectively. For prices we use consumer price estimates of energy (as
businesses are consumers of energy) reported in Table 3.3 and we label the
price of energy for each type as Pi. For each type of energy i, we add the
consumption of that energy type in all sectors and call that Qi. Then, total
energy expenditure is simply
P
i QitPit. We calculate real energy use using
1972 prices as the base year. Hence real energy use equals to
P
i QitPi1972:
The energy price de￿ ator Pt is simply the ratio of the total energy expendi-
7This data can be downloaded from the BEA website at
http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/faweb/AllFATables.asp.
8This data can be downloaded from the EIA website at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/contents.html.





The GDP de￿ ator is constructed in the usual way from nominal and real
GDP series reported in BEA￿ s NIPA Tables 1.1 and 1.2.
Figure 3. Energy Expenditure and use in the Business Sector
Total energy expenditures of the business sector was calculated as in
Figure 2 and then was divided by the nominal GDP of the business sector
(from NIPA). The total real energy use of the business sector (expenditure
using 1972 prices) was calculated as explained for Figure 2. This number
was divided by the real GDP of the business sector in 1972 prices. Real
GDP of the business sector data is from BEA￿ s NIPA Table 1.8. These
numbers are reported in 1996 dollars. We ￿rst construct a price de￿ ator
using nominal and real GDP of the business sector, readjust the level of the
de￿ ator such that 1972 = 1 rather than 1996. Then we multiply this number
with nominal GDP of business to get real GDP of business in 1972 dollars.
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